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Non-Technical Summary
The impact of privatisation on firm performance has generated a great deal of
attention in transition economics. In particular, how did the new corporate governance
structures that emerged in the transition process from centrally planned to market
economies perform compared with state owned enterprises? Earlier empirical studies
find that privatisation does not lead to better firm performance, while more recent studies
find that only privatisation to outsiders is beneficial for performance. Most empirical
studies to date develop a theme of insider rent seeking and corruption to explain the
failure of privatisation to insiders to generate efficiency gains.  In contrast to such a focus
on political distortions, this paper provides strong evidence that insider privatisation is
driven by political constraints, as modelled in Dewatripont and Roland (1995).
Sequencing, or the gradual release of firms to outside ownership, is a market driven
outcome, given the inherited market demand conditions that existed in Central Eastern
Europe. It is part of a good and politically acceptable path that ensures the long-term
success of the reform process.
An important emphasis in this paper is the role that inherited demand conditions
play both in dictating the selection process of firms to privatisation, and on their
subsequent performance. Within countries of CEE, strong trade links were developed
with the EU. Coming out of planning firms inherited product lines designed to supply
either the artificial CMEA market or the EU market. A detailed analysis of the Eurostat
Trade data clearly illustrates, confirming the results of Rodrik (1994) and Repkine and
Walsh (1999), that the reorientation of previously CMEA oriented products to the EU
market was not an important feature of the transition period. Using survey data for
Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia during the first seven years of transition, we
examine the impact of various corporate governance structures on firm performance
while controlling for the inherited demand conditions. The modelling of sequencing to
outside ownership, the conditioning of our sequencing and performance regressions on
the initial CMEA or EU trade orientation in 1988, and the inclusion of controls for time,
country and narrowly defined sectors and regional locations of firms are all novel
features of our empirical analysis in this paper.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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Controlling for other factors, we find that firms that produce historically EU
oriented products consistently outperform firms that inherited products historically
produced for the CMEA market during the first seven years of transition across our four
CEE countries. We provide evidence that while CEE countries were eager to restructure
the best firms in historically CMEA markets under outsider ownership, they resisted
privatisation to outsider ownership in historically EU markets.
In historically CMEA markets, outsiders were given the best firms to restructure
during transition, while the state and insiders maintained control of the loss making and
politically sensitive firms across our CEE countries during the first seven years of
transition. This was done to build political support for the restructuring of previously
CMEA market. The more problematic loss making firms would be dealt with later.
The political economy of privatising EU trade oriented state firms was more in
line with that observed in western economies. We show that the state and insiders in
such firms were reluctant to privatise these highly viable and expanding firms to
outsiders. Politically, it was more beneficial to retain control, undertake restructuring,
and support reforms that developed a properly functioning stock exchange, which would
eventually allow a successful public offering to outsiders. This was done to build
political support from populations linked to the previously EU market. The more
problematic issue of selling valuable assets to outsiders, for efficiency reasons, would
naturally happen at a later date.
As a result of the different political constraints imposed on the selection process
to outside ownership, the effect of corporate governance on firm performance was
shown to be different among previously CMEA and EU trade oriented firms. Majority
outside ownership outperforms majority insider/state ownership, but only when we
condition our regression on initial CMEA trade orientation controlling for a gradualist
selection process, pre- and post- privatisation effects, amongst other factors. This results
from the political incentives to preserve loss-making firms in the short-run. Majority
outside ownership does not outperform majority state/insider ownership whenWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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conditioned on initial EU trade orientation. This result is not surprising given the
political resistance to giving the best EU oriented firms to outsiders and the fact that such
firms are subcontracted by foreign licence, face upstream competition in their EU
market, do not have liquidity constraints and inherited mangers with experience in global
markets.
It is our thesis that political economy considerations induced insider profit
maximising considerations in historically EU oriented firms and insider cost minimising
considerations in historically CMEA oriented firms to have an important impact on the
privatisation process and its subsequent impact on firm performance. Throughout this
paper we have provided empirical evidence that political constraints driven by market
demand considerations, rather than political distortions, have imposed themselves on the
privatisation process and its subsequent impact on firm performance in Central Eastern
Europe. Insider ownership is an important political outcome, driven by market demand
considerations, that builds up political support for market reforms during its initial
stages, ensuring their long-term success.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
4
Abstract
Using survey data for 220 traditional manufacturing firms over 7 years of transition
and 4 CEE countries, we find firms that produced for the EU market under planning
consistently outperform those that produced for the CMEA market. Within the
previously CMEA market, the best firms were selected to outside privatisation and
outperformed insider/state owned firms. Outside privatisation was resisted in EU
oriented firms and ownership was found to have no effect on performance. We argue
that insider/state ownership in previously CMEA and EU markets builds up political
support for the market system during its initial stages, ensuring its long-term success.
Keywords:  Firm Performance, Political Economy,  Privatisation and Demand Shocks.
JEL Classification: P52William Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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 I. Introduction
The impact of privatisation on economic performance in transition countries has
generated much interest. Stiglitz (1999) portrays the general consensus that mass
privatisation, within a complementary package of “big bang” reforms, seems to have
failed to generate the expected efficiency gains across transition countries.
1 One outcome
of the privatisation programmes was that they somehow generated a bias towards insider
(worker and manager) ownership. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1994, 1996) argue that
the allocation of property rights to inside control was an attempt by government to gain
political support during privatisation which, as a consequence, in terms of economic
efficiency, lead to the failure of the privatisation process. Most empirical studies develop
this theme of insider rent seeking and corruption to explain this perceived empirical
failure of insider privatisation.
2 Such political distortions may be an accurate description
of the situation in Russia. However, in the Countries of Central Eastern Europe (CEE),
we provide empirical evidence that insider ownership is an important political outcome
that builds up political support for the privatisation process during its initial stages, and
ensures its long-term success. As modelled in Dewatripont and Roland (1995), we argue
that a gradual release of firms to outside ownership is a market driven outcome, given
the inherited market demand conditions that existed in CEE and political constraints.
This is a politically acceptable path that ensures the long-term success of the reform
process. We show that political constraints,  driven by inherited market demand
conditions, have imposed themselves on the privatisation process and its subsequent
impact on firm performance in CEE during the early days of transition. We do this using
survey evidence for Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia during the first seven
years of transition
The role of initial demand conditions on firm performance and ownership
structure during the transition period is emphasised in this paper. Compared to CIS
countries, CEE countries over the 1970s and 1980s developed strong trade links with the
EU. Coming out of planning state firms inherited production lines designed to supply
either the artificial CMEA market or the EU market. Due to a focus on scale economies
and specialisation under central planning each country inherited different clusters of
large monopolies producing for the EU and CMEA markets. Repkine and Walsh (1999)
highlight the importance of these inherited demand conditions in determining the
evolution of industrial output. They document the presence of exports to the EU in allWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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NACE Rev. 1 manufacturing sectors in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania in
1988, and the extreme clustering of such within sectors into certain 5-digit products.
Modelling the dynamics of industrial output across sectors of these countries, they
estimate the recovery in industrial output to be driven by EU oriented output over the
period 1990-96, within the same clustering of manufacturing products that were exported
before transition in 1988. Alongside these developments, they estimate a continual
decline of previously CMEA oriented output by sector of industry in each country. This
is consistent with the data on exports, Hoekman and Djankov (1997), that documents the
rapid decline in previously CMEA oriented trade and expansion in EU oriented trade in
the first few years of transition up to 1996.  Repkine and Walsh (1999) illustrate that the
U-shape experience of industrial sectors across CEE countries resulted from path
dependent investment demand shocks that induced a rapid decline in products
traditionally producing for the CMEA market and a gradual expansion in products
traditionally producing for EU market. The role of demand shocks challenges the thesis
that supply side distortions were the sole determinants of the evolution of industrial
output in CEE countries.
3
Given the findings of Repkine and Walsh (1999), one might expect the
ownership structures and the performance of firms operating in historically CMEA trade
oriented production to be different compared to that observed in firms inheriting EU
trade oriented production. The novelty of this paper is to examine the effects of inherited
demand conditions on firm performance both directly and indirectly via their impact on
corporate ownership. We provide evidence that initial demand conditions have a direct
impact on firm performance during transition. Controlling for other factors, firms that
produce EU oriented products consistently outperform firms that inherited products
historically produced for the CMEA market during the first seven years of transition
across our four CEE countries. This is due to the very different underlying conditions
and growth prospects of these firms coming out of planning. In addition, inherited
demand conditions impose interesting political constraints on the ownership structures of
firms during transition. The presence of two fundamentally different species of firms
under central planning is shown to have important implications for the political economy
of corporate governance and its impact on performance in Central Eastern Europe.
Within the artificially nurtured CMEA market, at the start of transition, some
non-viable and inefficient firms will eventually have to exit, while those with long-William Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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term viability are likely to have to undertake some degrees of restructuring during
transition. This is aptly summarised in the following: “Among production activities,
changes in relative prices and the loss of CMEA markets, imply that some are and
will remain loss making and must therefore be closed. The others may be viable, but
not without labour shedding and the infusion of new, more modern capital” [Aghion,
Blanchard and Burgess (1994), pp. 1330]. We provide evidence that CEE countries
undertook a gradualist approach to privatisation, in the manner modelled by
Dewatripont and Roland (1995), in historically CMEA markets. Building on the
seminal work of Alesina (1987), they model a politically acceptable way of inducing
reforms that are necessary in the transition to a market economy but have an overall
negative expected outcome on the population ex-ante. Reforms yielding positive
effects should be implemented first. The more painful reforms, necessary to sustain
benefits from initial reforms in the long run and avoid reversal costs, become
politically easier to implement at a later stage. “This is the effect of building
constituencies, using the ‘sweet pill’ of early reforms to have the population swallow
the ‘bitter pill’ of less popular reforms” [Roland, 1993, pp. 535]. In relation to
privatisation of previously CMEA firms therefore, sequencing is predicted where the
best enterprises needing restructuring with long-term growth opportunities should be
privatised first. The closing down or imposition of hard budget constraints on loss-
making previously CMEA firms should come at a later stage. We provide evidence
that CEE governments allowed such a gradualist approach in the privatisation of
previously CMEA firms. We show that in the previously CMEA market outsiders
were given the best firms to restructure during transition, while the state and insiders
maintained control of the loss making and politically sensitive firms across our CEE
countries during the early periods of transition.
In contrast, within the historical EU market, at the start of transition,
firms/workers inherited very different demand conditions. They produced viable high-
quality goods at low cost, historically sold into competitive upstream markets, and
subcontracted by western firms. Such firms operated in high growth areas and did not
require a lot of restructuring or finance in order to survive the transition process to a
market economy. The political economy of privatising EU trade oriented firms is
more in line with that observed in western economies. We show that the state and
insiders in firms were reluctant to privatise highly viable and expanding firms to
outsiders in the early days of transition.
4 Politically it was more beneficial to retainWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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control, undertake restructuring, and wait until the economy is more developed with a
properly functioning stock exchange that would allow a successful public offering.
5 In
relation to political economy of privatising previously EU firms therefore, sequencing
is recommended where enterprises with growth opportunities should be allowed to
wait before pursuing efficiency gains from outside ownership. The imposition of
outside ownership on profit making previously EU firms should come at a later stage.
Inside/State ownership allowed issues such as bankruptcy of out-dated CMEA
firms and the transfer of profitable EU oriented firms to outsiders to be dealt with at a
later date thus ensuring political acceptability of the initial reforms. As a result of the
different sequencing processes of firms for outside privatisation, the effect of
corporate governance on performance is different between previously CMEA and EU
trade oriented firms. A large literature exists on the effects of privatisation on firm
performance both for western and transition economies.
6 While the results are mixed,
many find that privatised firms outperform state owned firms.
7 In contrast to
Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999), we condition our firm performance
regression on a privatisation sequencing process, both conditioned on initial trade
orientation, while allowing for pre- and post- privatisation effects, amongst other
factors. We estimate for our sub-sample of firms inheriting CMEA trade oriented
production from central planning, even when allowing for sequencing in the selection
process, that majority outside ownership outperforms majority insider ownership.
8
State and insider owned under performed relative to the outside owned firms due to
the political incentives to preserve, with soft budget constraints, loss making firms in
the short run [Kornai 1988, Berglof and Roland 1998]. This strategy was undertaken
to gain long term political support for the restructuring process in the previously
CMEA market,  [Dewatripont and Roland (1995)].
In contrast, we estimate for our subsample of firms inheriting EU trade oriented
production from central planning, that majority outside ownership did not outperform
majority state or insider ownership. Given the political resistance to giving the best EU
oriented firms to outsiders and the fact that such firms are subcontracted by foreign
licence, face upstream competition in their EU market, inherited mangers with
experience in global markets with no liquidity constraints, this result should not be
surprising. If complete and enforceable contracts can be written between foreign and
home firms then privatisation should have no significant effect on performance [Hart,William Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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Shleifer and Vishny1997, Shleifer 1998]. Moreover, competition is documented to be as
effective as privatisation as a means of reforming state owned enterprises [Yarrow 1986,
Kay and Thompson 1986, Vickers and Yarrow 1988, Bishop and Kay 1989, Beesley and
Littlechild 1989, Caves 1990]. Finally, incumbent managers, for external finance
reasons, had good incentives to engage in the development of their firm, which contrasts
strongly with the incentives faced by insider mangers in loss making previously CMEA
firms, [Roland 1996]. Hence, the positive effect on firm performance from privatisation
is not found when regressions are conditioned on initial EU trade orientation, amongst
other factors. State and insider control of viable firms can be seen as a strategy that
gained long term political support for the restructuring process in the previously EU
market. While insider/state ownership minimised the losses in populations linked to
previously CMEA oriented firms; it maximised gains in populations linked to previously
EU oriented firms. This had the effect of building up political support for the market
system during its initial stages, ensuring its long-term success.
Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999) in their empirical work claim to
support the theoretical literature that see insider privatisation is a political distortion that
blocks the long-run success of the market system during transition. One has to condition
firm performance and the selection process to privatisation on initial trade orientation,
among other factors, to have an accurate interpretation of the role of insider ownership in
CEE countries. As modelled in Dewatripont and Roland (1995), we argue that a gradual
release of firms to outside ownership should be an expected outcome of market forces
under political constraints. Given the inherited market demand conditions that existed in
CEE, it is the only politically acceptable path that ensures the long-term success of the
reform process. Political constraints,  and not distortions, driven by market demand
considerations, have imposed themselves on the privatisation process and its subsequent
impact on firm performance in Central Eastern Europe during the early days of
transition.
Section II describes how we determine the historical trade orientation of firms.
Section III provides a detailed description of the LICOS survey data used in our
empirical analysis. The empirical modelling of the selection process to privatisation and
firm performance is undertaken in section IV. The final section of the paper concludes.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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II. Historical Trade Orientation of Firms
The  EUROSTAT TRADE STATISTICS database is a high quality database
providing annual data on trade flows by product categories between the European Union
and some 200 non-European Union countries. From this database, we obtained data on
exports to the EU from Bulgaria, Hungary, Solvenia, and Slovakia in 1988.
9 These
export flows were retrieved in thousands of ECUs at the 3-digit NACE-CLIO product
level, the lowest level of aggregation compatible with our survey data, and at the
corresponding broad NACE Rev. 1 sector levels. A list of these 14 1-digit sectors and
their CLIO 3 product components are highlighted in Table 1. Using these data we
classify products on the basis of their historical trade orientation. Virtually all CLIO 3-
digit products in 1988 exhibit some level of exports to the EU, but within broad sectors
these are highly concentrated in a small number of products. Hence the criteria for
classification of products by trade orientation is based on a Concentration Ratio of export
flows to the EU. Products within 1-digit sectors of each country that account for the
cumulative top 98 per cent of exports to the EU in 1988 are considered EU trade oriented
products. Products exhibiting either no exports to the EU or accounting for an
insignificant share of sector exports in 1988 are classified as being CMEA oriented
products under the central planning regime.
Table 1 details the classified trade orientation of 3-digit NACE-CLIO products
for each country based on our criteria. While in many instances the trade orientation of
products is similar over each of the countries in our analysis, there are also some marked
differences. In the Food, Beverage and Tobacco sector for example, the Mineral Water
and Soft Drinks product category (CLIO 427) is only considered EU trade oriented in
Slovakia, while Animal and Poultry feedings (CLIO 422) is EU trade oriented in all
countries except Slovakia.
Table 2a reports the percentage of CLIO 3-digit product categories in a sector
that are classified as being EU trade oriented by country in 1988. While all
manufacturing sectors exhibit some degree of trade with the European Union in 1988,
for many sectors this is fairly clustered within 3-digit products. For example, only 26 per
cent of products in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco sector of Bulgaria and Hungary
explain 98 per cent of its total exports to the EU. Table 2b documents the annual average
growth in sector exports over the period 1988 through to 1996. All sectors over time in
each of the countries exhibit positive growth in exports to the EU, although clearly inter-William Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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sectoral differences emerge. Despite the explosion in exports to the EU, exports remain
within the same clustering of manufacturing products that exported to the EU before
transition. The degree of persistence in product exports over time is indicated in Table
2c, which describes the share of 1996 exports accounted for by those products identified
as being EU oriented in 1988. Invariably, 1996 exports of products that were
traditionally EU trade oriented under central planning explain fully or the vast majority
of EU exports in 1996.
10 Confirming the results of Rodrik (1994), the reorientation of
previously CMEA oriented products to the EU market was not an important feature of
the transition period. These findings mirror those of  Repkine and Walsh (1999).
The survey data do not enquire into the historical markets of traditional firms.
Yet, we do know the CLIO 3-digit product category of traditional firms, which can be
identified as historically EU or CMEA trade oriented product during the planning
regime. The specialisation of large monopoly firms in products and markets, a core
feature of planning, ensures that the tagging of firms into historical markets by their
CLIO 3-digit product category proves to be a sensible control for a firms initial trade
orientation.
III. Data Description
Overview of the Data
The core data used in our analysis are derived from the LICOS firm level surveys
conducted in early 1997, which provides detailed firm level information for Bulgaria,
Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia.
11 This database was compiled on the basis of personal
interviews with the general manager and/or some other key managers of 513 individual
firms over our candidate countries. The firms were selected from different business
registers as well as from address books and databases from local research institutes, and
included a stratified sample of 50 per cent de novo firms in manufacturing, trade and
services and 50 per cent traditional firms, mainly selected from the manufacturing sector.
De novo firms are those that have been private since establishment and began operation
after 1989, while traditional firms describe those that existed under central planning.
 12
In this paper we are solely interested in analysing the relative performance of
traditional manufacturing firms by different ownership types. We obtain a cross-section
of 220 traditional manufacturing firms for Bulgaria (68 firms), Hungary (67 firms),William Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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Slovakia (48 firms), and Solvenia (37 firms) which successfully survived the transition
process to a market economy and were still operating at the time of the survey.
These traditional manufacturing firms provide detailed information on their
ownership structure in 1996. This enables us to examine the issues of corporate
governance. Firms are classified by region according to the level-3 Nomenclature of
Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). In addition, firms are classified by 3-digit NACE-
CLIO code on the basis of their main production. Knowledge of the primary product
categories in which a firm produces allows us to identify whether it inherited EU or
CMEA oriented production from the central planning regime on the basis of our analysis
in the previous section.
The survey asks retrospective questions on employment levels, dating back to
1990. While some firms do not report employment for the earlier years, the resultant
database is extremely rich: an unbalanced panel of 220 traditional manufacturing firms
over 7 years and 4 CEE countries with detailed information on employment, ownership,
regional and product classification. Before turning to our microanalysis of these data, we
first assess whether the data are representative of the manufacturing sector in terms of
official statistics on the evolution of manufacturing employment in each of our candidate
countries.
The Evolution of Manufacturing Employment
Industrial employment data by NACE Rev. 1 sectors of manufacturing is
obtained from official statistical yearbooks. Table 3 describes the actual evolution of
manufacturing employment in each of our 4 countries over time using an index of these
data, where employment is normalised by initial manufacturing employment in 1991.
With the exception of Bulgaria, the trend over the other CEE countries is one of
declining employment at a decreasing rate over time. This can be compared with the
evolution of manufacturing employment for the 220 firms in our survey, which accounts
for 10 per cent of 1996 total manufacturing employment in these countries. We observe
similar trends for each of the countries, but the rate of decline in the firms surveyed is
lower than the actual rate of decline in the country. Examining the evolution of
employment for CMEA compared with EU trade oriented firms in our survey, it is clear
that while both follow the overall trend in employment, the rate of decline is greater for
CMEA oriented firms. Firms that historically traded with the EU under central planningWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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clearly outperform those previously oriented to CMEA in terms of employment. In the
case of Slovenia for example, by 1996 manufacturing employment in CMEA firms
declined to 63 per cent of its 1991 level while that of EU oriented firms fell only to 90
per cent. The differential between the employment performance of CMEA and EU
oriented firms and the overall lower decline in our survey data compared with actual
employment trends indicates a bias in our sample towards surviving EU oriented firms.
This is evident in table 4.
Sector and Trade Orientation of Survey Sample
A decomposition of data by sector and initial trade orientation of products within
the 14 broad sectors of manufacturing for each of our candidate countries is provided in
Table 4. Examining firstly the total number of firms in each country by sector, it
becomes apparent that there is a reasonably good spread of surveyed firms over the 14
broad sectors of manufacturing. With few exceptions, every sector is represented in each
country with some inter-country and inter-sector variation. The percentage of EU trade
oriented firms (70 per cent overall) is highest in Slovakia (80 per cent) and lowest for
Hungary (64 per cent). While the EU oriented firms tend to have a good spread over
manufacturing sectors in general, CMEA oriented firms tend to be more clustered into
traditional sectors such as the Food, Beverage and Tobacco sector.
Regional Dimensions of Surveyed Firms
Regional differences in factor endowments, infrastructure and distance from EU
borders can result in differences in firm performance. Thus, while the speed and success
of firm restructuring in industrial sectors is dependent on the inherited trade orientation
of firms, in addition it may depend on regional specific factors. For this reason, it is
important to explicitly control for regional differences in the location of firms when
analysing ownership and performance in the transition to a market economy. Table 5
illustrates the regional classifications according to the level-3 Nomenclature of
Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) available from Eurostat, and the distribution of
firms over these regions. Virtually all regions are represented in our sample.  Moreover
firms in general and by trade orientation can be seen to have a good geographical spread.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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Corporate Structures of Surveyed Firms
The three main methods of privatisation include public offering through share
issue, asset sales and mass privatisation. In contrast to western economies, privatisation
in transition countries tends to be restricted to either asset sales or mass privatisation
programmes due to the low stock of private savings [Estrin, 1994] and the absence of a
developed stock exchange [Megginson, Nash, Netter and Poulsen 1998]. Mass
privatisation programmes, involving the transfer of vouchers into private hands for the
purchase of state assets, were initiated in waves in Bulgaria and Slovakia in 1995 and
1992, respectively, and continuously in Slovenia in 1994.
13 Privatisation in Hungary was
undertaken by asset sales in three phases, “Top down sales” in 1990, where the
government selected the firms, “Bottom up sales” in 1991-92, where firms selected
themselves and a final phase “Bottom up sales” from 1993 that focused on asset sales to
domestic outsiders. In all cases either the state or insiders dictated the selection of firms
for privatisation to outsiders. Pohl, Anderson, Claessens and Djankov (1997), using
6,300 firms across seven CEE countries during the period 1990-95, while controlling for
the fact that the best firms were selected first, find the method of privatisation (voucher
or asset sale) did not effect the likelihood of a firm undertaking successful restructuring.
For these reasons we model the ownership structures observed across our  countries as
an outcome of initial trade orientation and sequencing issues, amongst other factors. The
country specific privatisation programmes are not considered formally, but are implicitly
controlled for by the inclusion of country dummies in our selection and growth
equations.
Detailed information on the ownership structure of surveyed firms in 1996
enables us to classify firms by majority ownership type. State owned enterprises is
defined in World Bank (1995) as “government-owned or government-controlled
economic entities that generate the bulk of their revenues from selling good and
services”.  We model state owned as 50 per cent or more majority state ownership. The
state often retains a significant and often decisive influence in privatised firms in
transition economies.
14 Even after privatising, the state invariably retains some control of
the firm as a consequence of the firm being cash starved [Bolton and Roland 1992, Sinn
and Sinn 1993] or a desire for risk sharing in order to induce greater restructuring by the
private holder [Bennet and Maw 1998, Demougin and Sinn 1994, Cornelli and Li 1994].
Thus, partial state participation is a phenomenon of transition economies and our data.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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When majority control is in the hands of managers or workers we define the firm
to have majority insider ownership, as defined in the literature. When majority control is
in the hands of foreign or other domestic owners we define the firm to have majority
outside ownership. The governance structures in 1996 of the firms in our sample are
defined on the basis of the above classifications. Firms are grouped into their endpoint
ownership structure in the analysis of their performance over the transition period. As in
Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999), we assume that firms selected to state,
inside or outsider ownership in 1996 have unobservable group characteristics, or fixed
effects, that impacts firm growth over the entire transition period and not just from the
date of privatisation. This controls for both pre- and post- privatisation effects in our
empirical modelling.
Table 6 decomposes our sample of firms by ownership status and trade
orientation in 1996.  Overall, we have 35 per cent state owned traditional firms, with 40
and 25 per cent respectively being classified as majority outsider and insider owned.
These relative shares by ownership type are similar for both traditionally EU and CMEA
oriented firms, and so there is a good representation of each type of firm in our sample.
Employment Size and Firm Growth
In this paper we measure firm performance in terms of employment growth. This
circumvents many of the difficulties inherent in measuring performance in terms of
revenue, productivity or profitability in transition economies.
15 The employment effects
of the privatisation process is a crucial policy variable. Retrospective questions on
employment size provide us with details of total numbers employed by firms from 1990
through to 1996. The effect of privatisation on employment across various countries has
tended to have an ambiguous effect. Boubakri and Cosset (1998) find that privatisation
of firms in developing countries improves performance measures in terms of
employment. On the other hand, D’Souza and Megginson (1998) find that privatisation
reduces employment in both developing and developed countries. Frydman, Gray,
Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999) find no employment effects from privatisation in CEE
transition countries.
The summary statistics on average firm size and employment growth over the
transition period grouped by ownership type in 1996 and trade orientation in 1988 are
presented in Table 7 both for the initial and later years. We note that the sample consistsWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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of large firms that were continually downsizing over the first seven years of transition. In
our regression analysis we will need to control for the effects of downsizing. This is
particularly true for firms selected to majority outsider control by 1996, which tend to be
larger on average than firms that remain state over the period in question. Taking the
CMEA oriented firms, it is clear in the raw data, that firms selected to outsider control
perform better than either firms selected to insider control or those that remained in state
hands in 1996. This is very evident in the initial period, when the average growth of
outsider firms is –0.02, as compared with –0.11 and –0.12 for insider and state owned
firms respectively. Regarding the EU trade oriented firms, the performance of firms over
transition does not seem to differ dramatically over the different ownership groups
observed in 1996. In the latter period of transition, the average growth rates are –0.02, -
0.01 and –0.03 for majority state, outsider and insider firms, respectively. These statistics
are in line with the theoretical predictions outlined in the opening section of this paper.
Privatisation to outsiders in the previously CMEA trade oriented firms seems to have
had a better employment performance when compared to the state or insider owned
firms during the transition period. No significant effect of ownership structure on the
evolution of employment is observed during transition in historically EU trade oriented
firms. We now proceed to verify these conclusions in an econometric model that controls
for sample selection issues amongst other time, country, sector and region specific
factors.
IV. Empirical Modelling
In this section we undertake an empirical modelling of firm performance and the
political economy of corporate governance for traditional manufacturing firms in
Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. This analysis extends the approach taken in
Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999). They use a sample of 218 small and
medium traditional firms for the period 1990 through 1994 in Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic, to examine the effects of insider and outsider ownership on various
measures of firm performance, including employment. They control for pre-and post –
privatisation effects on firm growth using group effects, as in this paper. We extend their
analysis of insider and outsider corporate governance by using a richer panel database on
220 traditional manufacturing firms spanning CEE countries over a longer time span,
1990 through 1996. The novel features of our approach include the modelling of
sequencing to outside ownership in 1996, the conditioning of our sequencing andWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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performance regressions on the initial trade orientation of firms in 1988, and the
inclusion of controls for time, country and narrowly defined sectors and regional
locations of firms. These novelties have a significant impact on our results and add to our
understanding of the impact of ownership structures on firm performance during the
early stages of transition in CEE countries. In particular, insider ownership should not be
seen as a bad thing, per se, but rather an outcome of market forces and political
constraints that ensures the long-term success of the privatisation programme.
The Selection Process to Privatisation
We now proceed to empirically model the selection process to ownership groups
in 1996. Our key explanatory variables include a dummy for inherited trade orientation
in 1988 and sequencing effects, among other factors. To capture the effect of the best
firms being selected for privatisation first, we include the employment growth rate of a
firm in an early period of transition, 1991-1992.  Most firms in our sample were state
owned during this period, the exception being a few firms that may have been involved
in the first wave in Hungary.  Thus we estimate the probability of firms being privatised
in 1996 in the following equation,
i i t i i Controls Trade Growth Ownership ε β β β β + + + + = − 4 3 4 , 2 0 96 , (1)
The ownership structure firms is defined for 1996. The growth performance in
1992, rather than 1991, is selected since this has the advantage of maximising the
number of survey responses while allowing three years for state firms to restructure
during transition. Following the growth of firms literature, in the spirit of Davis and
Haltwinger (1992), we compute growth in a discrete way for firm i, bounded in the
interval –2 and +2, by the following,
() 2 / 1
1
−
−
+
−
=
t t
t t
it Emp Emp
Emp Emp
Growth (2)
The variable Trade indicates the trade orientation that the firm inherits from
central planning. This is equal to 1 where firms are primarily producing in NACE CLIO
3-digit products that exported to the EU in 1988, as described in section II of the paper.
Other controls include country and regional level-3 NUTS dummies. It is very important
to control for regions in modelling the selection process to privatisation given the
regional differences in development. Since ownership structures do not vary greatlyWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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within individual 3-digit products but there are variations in ownership structures across
broader sectors, we include sector controls at the 1-digit level.
The first specification of this model defines Ownership equal to 1 where firms
are majority privatised (insider or outsider) in 1996 and 0 otherwise. The results of the
logit regression are presented in the first column of Table 8.
16 The overall explanatory
power of the model is high, R² of 0.63. Although not reported, country, sector and
regional controls are strongly significant indicating differences in the probability of a
firm being privatised over these variables. For example, compared to the default
category, Bulgaria, firms are more likely to be privatised in each of the other candidate
countries.
The inherited trade orientation of firms has a negative and significant, at the 5
per cent level, effect on the selection process. This indicates that firms that were
previously EU trade oriented under central planning are less likely to be privatised by
1996. The state is less likely to privatise highly viable and expanding firms compared
to previously CMEA trade oriented firms that require restructuring. As highlighted in
the introduction, they find it more profitable to retain control of the EU oriented firms,
undertake restructuring, and wait until the economy is more developed with a properly
functioning stock exchange to allow a successful public offering.
The probability of being privatised is positively related to firm performance in
the early years of transition, but only in the subsample of CMEA firms. This sequencing
effect is completely offset in our subsample of EU oriented firms. Within the previously
CMEA market there was a sequencing of firms in the privatisation process, with the best
performers more likely to be privatised first. In contrast, there is no apparent sequencing
in the privatisation of historically EU trade oriented firms, where all firms seem equally
viable but collectively less likely to be privatised when compared to historically CMEA
firms.
The second specification of the selection model decomposes the average
ownership effect further into majority insider and outsider ownership. The results of this
multinomial logit regression analysis are presented in the final two columns of Table 8,
which illustrate the probability of firms being outsider or insider controlled in 1996
compared with the benchmark case of majority state ownership. Rather interesting
results emerge. Column 2 reports the probability of firms being outsider owned
compared to state owned in 1996. CMEA firms are more likely to be privatised toWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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outsiders than EU oriented firms, and there is apparent sequencing in the privatisation of
CMEA firms to outsiders, as the best performers in 1992 had a higher probability of
being selected. In contrast, there is no apparent sequencing in the privatisation of EU
trade oriented firms to outsiders.
These results contrast greatly with those relating to the probability of firms being
majority insider owned in 1996 when compared with the benchmark case of majority
state ownership. In column 3 of Table 8 we observe evidence of sequencing in
privatisation, irrespective of the inherited trade orientation of firms. Firms that perform
better relative to state firms in 1992 are more likely to be selected to insider control
irrespective of trade orientation. In addition trade orientation is not an important factor in
the selection of state firms to insider ownership during transition.
These results suggest that the state and insiders did not have a desire to release
control of the EU trade oriented firms during transition. They prefer to wait until the
stock exchange is adequately developed to ensure a maximum return for these profitable
firms in a public share offering. In contrast the state and insiders did have a preference to
retain control of poor performing firms with a previously CMEA orientation. Such
insider/state control across markets was done to minimise the losses of populations
involved in previously CMEA markets and maximise the gains of populations historical
involved in EU markets. Given market demand considerations, these outcomes paved a
politically acceptable path for the reforms during the early days of transition and ensured
long term political support for privatisation and the market system.
Firm Performance, Ownership and Trade Orientation
We are now in a position to model firm performance, in terms of employment,
during the period 1990-96 across our 4 CEE countries. The basic growth model we
estimate is as follows,
i i
i i it
Controls Trade
Ownership Size Initial Growth
ε β β
β β β
+ +
+ + + =
4 3
96 , 2 1 0
 (3)
The employment growth of firm i is computed once again as in (2), where t is
defined annually from 1991 through to 1996. From Table 7 the need to control for firm
downsizing becomes apparent, and so we include Initial Sizei which measures the size of
firm in 1990. We firstly examine the average effects of firm types grouped by ownership
structure in 1996, Ownershipi,96., on firm performance during the transition period, whichWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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controls for pre-and post-privatisation fixed effects of our firm groupings. Ownership is
initially defined as being equal to 1 when a firm is majority private owned and 0 when
majority state owned. We first estimate the average effect of privatisation. We initially
take ownership structure as a given variable, an assumption that is relaxed later when we
instrument ownership structure using the predicted values obtained from our selection
equations reported in Table 8. The variable Trade indicates the trade orientation that the
firm inherits from central planning as before, being equal to 1 in the case of EU trade
oriented and zero otherwise. Controls include country, year, 3-digit product, and regional
level-3 NUTS dummies.  The results of various specifications of this model are given in
Table 9.
The first column reports the results without conditioning our independent
variables on the inherited trade orientation of firms. Country, year, regional and product
controls, although not reported here, are highly significant factors in determining firm
performance. Initial size is not statistically significant. What is of primary interest is the
fact that majority privatised firms do not perform significantly better than state owned. In
the second column we introduce the trade orientation of firms in 1988. Neither
ownership nor inherited trade orientation is significant at the 5 per cent level. This
specification however, fails to recognise that the impact of ownership on firm
performance may depend on the trade orientation, EU versus CMEA, of firms. In
column three we condition each of our independent variables on the inherited trade
orientation of firms.  The results are striking. Firms that are EU trade oriented perform
significantly better than those firms producing products that were previously direct to the
CMEA. Ownership is now positive and significant at the 5 per cent level for the
subsample of CMEA oriented firms – privatised CMEA firms performed significantly
better than non-privatised firms did over the transition period. However, examining the
interaction effect of ownership with EU trade orientation, we observe that the benefits of
privatisation are not present in the sample of EU oriented firms. There are no advantages
to privatisation in historically EU trade oriented firms. The above results may be a result
of the selection processes modelled in Table 8 since both historical firm performance and
trade orientation played a role in the determination of firm structure in 1996. Thus, in our
final specification we instrument the ownership variable in order to correct for such
sample selection problems. The final column of Table 9 documents the results of the
growth models using the predicted values of ownership from Table 8. Our results are
robust to such instrumentation. Firms that are EU trade oriented perform significantlyWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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better over the transition period than those firms producing products that were previously
directed to the CMEA, but there are no benefits to the privatisation of such, while
CMEA firms reap benefits from privatisation. These results hold even when conditioned
on the fact that all EU firms were less likely to be privatised, while good firms from a
CMEA background were more likely to privatised.
From the above, it is clear that the average effects of private ownership had a
positive effect on performance during the entire transition period amongst firms coming
from a background of producing a product for the CMEA market, even when we control
for possible endogeneity in the ownership structure. We now decompose the average
effect into its two main components: that determined by privatisation to insiders and that
due to outsider privatisation. The results are documented in Table 10. Once again,
country, regional, product and year controls are highly significant, although not reported
here. In columns 1 and 2 the benefit of outside ownership is significant even when we do
not condition the effect of ownership on firm performance on inherited trade orientation.
Conditioning ownership on inherited trade orientation in column 3, we find that
firms which are EU trade oriented perform significantly better than those firms
producing products that were previously directed to the CMEA. Outsider ownership is
positive and significant at the 5 per cent level, but only in the subsample of CMEA
oriented firms. Once again, the benefits of outsider ownership are completely offset in
the sample of EU oriented firms. This contrasts greatly with the effects of insider
privatisation on firm performance. Insider controlled firms do not perform statistically
better than majority state owned firms, irrespective of their inherited trade orientation.
To correct for any possible endogeneity in ownership structure, the final column uses the
predicted values of ownership from Table 8. The results are duplicated even when using
instrumented ownership.
 Conclusions
In this paper we use representative survey data, a rich unbalanced panel of 220
traditional manufacturing firms over 7 years and 4 CEE countries with detailed
information on employment, ownership, regional and product classification, to model
the determinants of firm performance and ownership structures during transition. We
highlight the role of historical firm trade orientation, whether producing for the EU or
CMEA market under planning, on the determination of firm performance duringWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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transition and the political constraints it imposes on the determination of ownership
structure and its subsequent impact on firm performance, among other factors.
Controlling for other factors, firms that produce historically EU oriented
products consistently outperform firms that inherited products historically produced
for the CMEA market during the first 7 years of transition across our 4 CEE countries.
We provide evidence that while CEE countries where eager to restructure the best
firms in historically CMEA markets under outsider ownership, they resisted outsider
ownership in historically EU markets. In historically CMEA markets, outsiders were
given the best firms to restructure during transition, while the state and insiders
maintained control of the loss making and politically sensitive firms across our CEE
countries during the first 7 years of transition. This was done to build political support
for the restructuring of previously CMEA market. The more problematic loss making
firms would be dealt with later.
 The political economy of privatising EU trade oriented state firms was more
in line with those observed in western economies. We show that the state and insiders
in such firms were reluctant to privatise these highly viable and expanding firms to
outsiders. Politically, it was more beneficial to retain control, undertake restructuring,
and support reforms that developed a properly functioning stock exchange, which
would eventually allow a successful public offering to outsiders. This was done to
build political support from populations linked to the previously EU market. The more
problematic issue of selling valuable assets to outsiders, for efficiency reasons, would
naturally happen at a later date.
As a result of the different political constraints imposed on the selection process
to outside ownership, the effect of corporate governance on firm performance was
shown to be different among previously CMEA and EU trade oriented firms. Majority
outside ownership outperforms majority insider/state ownership, but only when we
condition our regression on initial CMEA trade orientation controlling for a gradualist
selection process, pre- and post- privatisation effects, amongst other factors. This results
from the political incentives to preserve loss-making firms in the short-run. Majority
outside ownership does not outperform majority state/insider ownership when
conditioned on initial EU trade orientation. This result is not surprising given the
political resistance to giving the best EU oriented firms to outsiders and the fact that such
firms are subcontracted by foreign licence, face upstream competition in their EUWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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market, do not have liquidity constraints and inherited mangers with experience in global
markets.
It is our thesis that political economy considerations induced insider profit
maximising considerations in historically EU oriented firms and insider cost minimising
considerations in historically CMEA oriented firms to have an important impact on the
privatisation process and its subsequent impact on firm performance. Throughout this
paper we have provided empirical evidence that political constraints driven by market
demand considerations, rather than political distortions, have imposed themselves on the
privatisation process and its subsequent impact on firm performance in Central Eastern
Europe. Employment gains from privatisation are evident in historically CMEA oriented
firms. Similar gains from privatisation are not present in historically EU oriented firms,
but their inheritance ensured that such firms performed relatively well in terms of
employment creation during transition and irrespective of whether they were privatised
or not. Clearly trade liberalisation and history rather than privatisation induced these
employment gains.
The conditioning of our analysis on initial demand conditions greatly helps to
unravel puzzling empirical outcomes in relation to issues of corporate governance in
CEE. The established literature sees insider privatisation as a political distortion that
blocks efficiency gains from the privatisation programme during transition.  Yet if one
conditions firm performance and the sequencing process to outside privatisation on
initial trade orientation, among other factors, one gets an accurate description of the role
of insider ownership in the countries of CEE. Insider ownership is an important political
outcome, driven by market demand considerations, that builds up political support for
market reforms during its initial stages, ensuring their long-term success.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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Table 1: 1988 Trade Orientation of Manufacturing Products
1-Digit Sector Clio3 Bulgaria Hungary Slovakia Slovenia
Products EU Trade EU Trade EU Trade EU Trade
411 0 0 0 1
412 1 1 1 1
413 1 1 1 0
414 1 1 1 1
415 1 0 0 0
416 0 0 0 0
417 0 0 0 0
418 0 0 0 0
419 0 0 0 0
420 0 0 0 1
421 0 0 1 1
422 1 1 0 1
423 0 1 1 1
424 0 0 0 0
425 0 0 0 0
426 0 0 0 0
427 0 0 1 0
428 0 0 0 0
1. Food, Beverage and Tobacco
429 0 0 0 0
431 1 1 0 1
432 1 1 1 1
436 1 1 1 1
438 1 1 1 0
439 0 0 1 0
453 1 1 1 1
455 1 1 1 1
2. Textiles and Textile Products
456 0 1 0 0
441 0 1 0 1
442 1 1 1 0
3. Leather and Leather Products
451 1 1 1 1
461 1 1 1 1
462 1 1 1 1
463 0 1 0 1
464 0 0 0 0
465 1 1 0 0
466 1 0 0 1
4. Wood Products
467 1 1 1 1
471 1 1 1 1
472 0 0 0 1
473 1 1 1 0
5. Paper, Printing and Publishing
474 0 0 0 0
120 0 0 0 0
140 1 1 1 1
6. Fuels Production
152 0 0 0 0
252 1 1 1 1
253 1 1 1 1
255 0 0 0 0
256 1 1 1 1
257 1 0 0 0
258 0 0 0 0
259 0 0 0 1
7. Chemicals, products, fibers
260 0 1 1 1
481 1 1 1 1
482 0 0 0 0
8. Rubber and Plastic Products
483 1 1 1 0William Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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1-Digit Sector Clio3 Bulgaria Hungary Slovakia Slovenia
Products EU Trade EU Trade EU Trade EU Trade
241 1 0 0 0
242 0 1 1 1
243 0 0 1 0
245 1 1 0 1
246 0 0 0 1
247 1 1 1 1
9. Mineral Materials and Products
248 1 1 1 1
221 1 1 1 1
222 1 1 1 1
223 1 1 1 1
224 1 1 1 1
311 0 1 0 1
312 0 0 0 0
313 0 0 1 0
314 0 1 1 1
315 0 0 0 0
10. Basic Metals and Fab. products
316 1 1 1 1
321 0 1 1 1
322 1 1 1 1
323 0 0 1 0
324 0 1 0 1
325 1 1 1 1
326 1 1 1 1
327 0 1 0 1
11. Machinery, excluding Electrical
328 1 1 1 1
330 1 0 1 1
341 0 0 1 1
342 1 1 1 1
343 1 1 1 1
344 1 1 1 1
345 1 1 1 1
346 1 1 1 1
347 1 1 1 0
371 1 1 1 1
372 1 1 0 0
373 0 0 0 1
12. Electrical and Optical Equipment
374 0 0 1 0
351 0 1 1 1
352 0 0 0 1
353 1 1 1 1
361 0 0 0 0
362 1 1 1 0
363 0 0 1 1
364 0 1 0 1
13. Transport Equipment
365 0 0 0 0
491 0 1 1 0
492 0 0 0 0
494 1 0 1 1
14. Other Manufactured Products
495 1 1 1 1William Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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Table 2a: Share of EU Oriented Clio3 Products within Sectors in 1988
Nace Rev 1 Digit Sector Share of EU Trade Oriented Products # Products per
Sector Bulgaria Hungary Slovakia Slovenia
1. Food, Beverage and Tobacco 19 0.26 0.26 0.32 0.37
2. Textiles and Textile Products 8 0.75 0.88 0.75 0.63
3. Leather and Leather Products 3 0.67 1.00 0.67 0.67
4. Wood Products 7 0.71 0.71 0.43 0.71
5. Paper, Printing and Publishing 4 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
6. Fuels Production 3 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
7. Chemicals Products, Fibres 8 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.63
8. Rubber and Plastic Products 3 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33
9. Mineral Materials and Products 7 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.71
10. Basic Metals and Fabricated Products 10 0.50 0.70 0.70 0.70
11. Machinery, excluding Electrical 8 0.50 0.88 0.75 0.88
12. Electrical and Optical Equipment 12 0.75 0.67 0.83 0.75
13. Transport Equipment 8 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.63
Table 2b: Annual Average Growth in Sector Exports, 1988-96
Nace Rev 1 Digit Sector Bulgaria Hungary Slovakia Slovenia
1. Food, Beverage and Tobacco 0.09 0.07 0.16 0.11
2. Textiles and Textile Products 0.28 0.24 0.31 0.21
3. Leather and Leather Products 0.37 0.32 0.38 0.14
4. Wood Products 0.17 0.14 0.21 0.15
5. Paper, Printing and Publishing 0.06 0.19 0.19 0.15
6. Fuels Production 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.63
7. Chemicals Products, Fibres 0.17 0.12 0.26 0.22
8. Rubber and Plastic Products 0.15 0.19 0.29 0.19
9. Mineral Materials and Products 0.21 0.14 0.22 0.21
10. Basic Metals and Fabricated Products 0.23 0.16 0.31 0.20
11. Machinery, excluding Electrical 0.15 0.23 0.29 0.27
12. Electrical and Optical Equipment 0.16 0.35 0.41 0.21
13. Transport Equipment 0.29 0.58 0.59 0.22
Table 2c: 1988 Trade Oriented Products: Exports in 1996 as a Share of 1996 Exports
Nace Rev 1 Digit Sector Bulgaria Hungary Slovakia Slovenia
1. Food, Beverage and Tobacco 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.8
2. Textiles and Textile Products 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
3. Leather and Leather Products 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9
4. Wood Products 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9
5. Paper, Printing and Publishing 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9
6. Fuels Production 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
7. Chemicals Products, Fibres 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9
8. Rubber and Plastic Products 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.6
9. Mineral Materials and Products 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9
10. Basic Metals and Fabricated Products 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9
11. Machinery, excluding Electrical 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0
12. Electrical and Optical Equipment 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.0
13. Transport Equipment 0.2 1.0 1.0 1.0
Source: EUROSTAT Trade Data, 1988William Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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Table 3: Evolution of Manufacturing Employment
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Bulgaria
Actual 1 0.83 0.70 0.67 0.75 0.79
Survey – All 1 0.84 0.74 0.69 0.76 0.74
Survey – CMEA 1 0.83 0.68 0.62 0.67 0.65
Survey – EU 1 0.84 0.76 0.71 0.79 0.78
Hungary
Actual 1 0.85 0.74 0.68 0.65 0.63
Survey – All 1 0.94 0.86 0.79 0.75 0.71
Survey – CMEA 1 0.94 0.86 0.78 0.72 0.63
Survey – EU 1 0.95 0.87 0.80 0.77 0.76
Slovakia
Actual 1 0.87 0.78 0.75 0.75 0.74
Survey – All 1 0.98 0.93 0.87 0.86 0.85
Survey – CMEA 1 0.99 0.96 0.82 0.82 0.81
Survey – EU 1 0.97 0.92 0.88 0.87 0.86
Slovenia
Actual 1 0.89 0.81 0.77 0.74 0.69
Survey – All 1 0.95 0.90 0.91 0.89 0.86
Survey – CMEA 1 0.91 0.78 0.73 0.71 0.63
Survey – EU 1 0.95 0.92 0.95 0.92 0.90
Source: LICOS Industrial Database and LICOS Survey Database
Table 4: Number of Firms by Sector and Trade Orientation
Nace Rev 1 Digit Sector Bulgaria Hungary Slovakia Slovenia
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1. Food, Beverage and Tobacco 1 8 71 1 2 6 1 2 1 4 1 1072 5
2. Textiles and Textile Products 13 12 1 11 10 1 12 10 2 5 5 0
3. Leather and Leather Products 32111 00 0022 0
4. Wood Products 98122 03 2155 0
5. Paper, Printing and Publishing 20211 00 0032 1
6. Fuels Production 00000 01 1011 0
7. Chemicals Products, Fibres 21151 48 4410 1
8. Rubber and Plastic Products 33022 02 2000 0
9. Mineral Materials and Products 20211 03 3022 0
10. Basic Metals and Fabricated Products 21172 57 7042 2
11. Machinery, excluding Electrical 85333 03 3022 0
12. Electrical and Optical Equipment 22066 06 5133 0
13. Transport Equipment 32111 02 1122 0
14. Other Manufactured Products 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
T O T A L 6 84 42 46 74 3 2 44 8 3 9 9 3 72 89
Total Firms  Overall = 220
Total EU Firms Overall = 154
Source: LICOS Survey DatabaseWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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Table 5: Manufacturing Firms by Regional Classifications According to the
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS)
1
Bulgaria EU CMEA Hungary EU CMEA
Sofia – Capital City 5 3 Budapest 13 7
Dobrich 3 2 Pest 5 1
Veliko Turnovo 1 1 Veszprem 1 1
Gabrovo 3 0 Komaron-Esztergom 1 1
Lovech 2 1 Gyor-Moson-Sopron 1 2
Pleven 2 0 Zala 3 1
Vidin 2 1 Baranya 2 0
Vratsa 1 0 Somogy 0 3
Razgrad 2 3 Tolna 1 0
Rousse 1 1 Borsod-Abauj-Zempln 1 2
Silistra 1 2 Heves 1 0
Turgovishte 3 1 Nograd 3 0
Bourgas 2 0 Hajdu-Bihar 1 1
Sliven 1 1 Jasz-Nagykun-Szolnok 2 0
Yambol 2 1 Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg 2 2
Pazardjik 1 1 Bacs-Kiskun 1 0
Plovdiv 2 3 Bekes 2 2
Blagoevgrad 1 0 Csongrad 3 1
Pernik 2 1
Kurdjali 3 1
Stara Zagora 1 1
Haskovo 3 0
Total Firms 44 24 Total Firms 43 24
Slovakia EU CMEA Slovenia EU CMEA
Bratislavsky 5 0 Pomurska 4 4
Trnavsky 2 1 Podravska 4 2
Trenciansky 5 4 Koroska 2 0
Nitriansky 4 1 Savinjska 4 1
Zilinsky 5 0 Dolenjska 3 0
Banskobystricky 8 0 Osrednjeslovenska 2 0
Presovsky 4 3 Gorenjska 6 1
Kosicky 6 0 Notranjsko-Kraska 2 0
Oblano-Kraska 1 1
Total Firms 39 9 Total Firms 28 9
1. Regional Classification Level-3 NUTS
Source: LICOS Survey Database
Table 6: Ownership Structure of Survey Sample
Total Sample EU Trade Oriented
Firms
CMEA Oriented
Firms
Total Number of Firms 220 154 66
       Majority State Owned 35 % 34 % 38 %
       Majority Outsider Owned 40 % 39 % 41 %
       Majority Insider Owned 25 % 27 % 21 %
Source: LICOS Survey DatabaseWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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Table 7: Survey Manufacturing Employment Growth and Size
Size 1990-92 Size 1992-96 Growth
1990-92
Growth
1992-96
Majority State Owned
EU Firms 1045 833 -0.09 -0.02
CMEA Firms 652 622 -0.12 -0.07
Majority Privatised
EU Firms 987 801 -0.05 -0.03
CMEA Firms 949 648 -0.03 -0.06
Majority Outsider Owned
EU Firms 1252 967 -0.05 -0.03
CMEA Firms 1260 856 -0.02 -0.04
Majority Insider Owned
EU Firms 685 594 -0.03 -0.01
CMEA Firms 395 320 -0.11 -0.06
Source: LICOS Survey Database
Table 8: Ownership Selection Logit Regressions: State and Privatised Manufacturing
Firms 1996
a
Model II Multinomial Logit:
Ownership96
Model I Logit:
State vs. Private State vs.
Outsiders
State vs.
Insiders
Growtht-4 34.6
(2.82)*
46.6
(3.00)*
33.0
(2.07)*
Trade Orientation -3.98
(2.63)*
- 3.97
(2.35)*
- 2.99
(1.68)
Growtht-4 X
Trade Orientation
- 35.4
(2.77)*
- 51.0
(3.05)*
- 15.8
(0.94)
Constant 2.51
(1.36)
0.86
(0.50)
- 72.4
(0.00)
Regional Level Dummies YES YES YES
Sector Dummies YES YES YES
Country Dummies YES YES YES
R
2 0.63 0.70
Number Observations 176 176
a T-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at the 5 per cent levelWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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Table 9: Ownership Regressions: State and Privatised Manufacturing Firms over the
period 1991-1996
 a
State versus Private Ownership Instrumented
Ownership
Growth Firm t Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Initial Size - 0.00001
(1.50)
- 0.00001
(1.80)
- 0.00003
(1.56)
- 0.00002
(0.74)
Initial Size X
Trade Orientation
0.00002
(0.98)
0.00002
(0.62)
Privatised Ownership 0.04
(1.70)
0.04
(1.75)
0.14
(3.00)*
0.22
(2.82)*
Trade Orientation 0.10
(1.67)
0.16
(1.98)*
0.22
(2.00)*
Privatised Ownership X
Trade Orientation
- 0.12
(2.36)*
- 0.17
(2.08)*
Constant - 0.16
(1.80)
- 0.27
(2.44)*
- 0.29
(2.61)*
- 0.47
(3.31)*
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES
Regional Level Dummies: NUTS level 3 YES YES YES YES
Product Dummies: NACE CLIO 3 YES YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES
R
2 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.28
Number Observations 1003 1003 1003 938
Heteroscedasticity χ 2(137) = 146 χ 2(136) = 121 χ 2(136) = 126 χ 2(128) = 110
Autocorrelation, AR1 χ 2(1) = 8 χ 2(1) = 8 χ 2(1) = 10 χ 2(1) = 9
a T-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at the 5 per cent levelWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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Table 10: Ownership Regressions: Majority State, Outside and Insider Owned
Manufacturing Firms over the period 1991-1996
 a
State versus Inside and Outside Ownership Instrumented
Ownership
Growth Firm t Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Initial Size - 0.00001
(1.47)
- 0.00002
(1.94)
- 0.00003
(1.52)
- 0.00002
(0.91)
Initial Size X
Trade Orientation
0.00002
(0.88)
0.00002
(0.75)
Insider Owned 0.004
(0.13)
- 0.01
(0.42)
0.08
(1.19)
0.05
(0.44)
Outsider Owned 0.05
(2.10)*
0.06
(2.40)*
0.14
(2.97)*
0.17
(2.32)*
Trade Orientation 0.15
(2.41)*
0.20
(2.37)*
0.21
(1.99)*
Insider Owned X
Trade Orientation
- 0.11
(1.40)
- 0.07
(0.68)
Outsider Owned X
Trade Orientation
- 0.11
(1.97)*
- 0.18
(2.23)*
Constant - 0.18
(2.01)*
- 0.36
(3.10)*
- 0.39
(3.02)*
- 0.46
(3.16)*
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES
Regional Level Dummies: NUTS level 3 YES YES YES YES
Product Dummies: NACE CLIO 3 YES YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES
R
2 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.27
Number Observations 1003 1003 1003 938
Heteroscedasticity χ 2(136) = 120 χ 2(136) = 121 χ 2(136) = 125 χ 2(128) = 108
Autocorrelation, AR1 χ 2(1) = 8 χ 2(1) = 9 χ 2(1) = 10 χ 2(1) = 8
a T-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at the 5 per cent levelWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
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Endnotes
                                                
1 With regard to speed and the sequencing of reforms, the “Big Bang” approach stresses the
complementarity of reforms for economic consistency, as in Blanchard et al 1991, Lipton and Sachs 1990,
Newbery 1991, and Portes 1991.
2 The apparent failure of privatisation to insiders, as defined by workers and managers of the firm, is found
in Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1999), Earle and Estrin (1996), Blanchard and Aghion (1996),
Murphy, Shleifer and Vining (1993).
3 The emphasis on supply side distortions as the sole determinant of the evolution of industrial output in
CEE countries is found in Atkeson and Kehoe (1996), Blanchard (1997), Blanchard and Kremer (1997)
and Roland and Verdier (1997). While supply side considerations may be extremely relevant when
explaining the evolution of historically CMEA oriented production during transition, [see Konings and
Walsh (1999) for the case of Ukraine], their constraint on the evolution of historically EU oriented
production is not evident.
4 Cornelli and Li (1997) and Katz and Owen (1993) indicate that the state may be reluctant to privatise
firms to outsiders in order to protect employment.
5 Martin and Parker (1995) examine UK firms in the 1980s and find many improved in terms of
performance before privatisation indicating a shake-out and restructuring of firms pre-privatisation. Li
(1997) on a sample of 272 state owned Chinese firms show the benefits of the 1979 market reforms on firm
performance during 1980-1989 in the absence of privatisation. Dewenter and Malatesta (1998) find that
operating profits increase prior to divestiture but may decrease somewhat afterward. This is interpreted as
evidence that governments efficiently restructure some firms before privatising in order to receive a higher
price on privatising, although the actual change in ownership does not give rise to subsequent efficiency
gains. Nellis and Kikeri (1989) suggest state restructuring pre-privatisation in order to eliminate distortions
such as those arising from Trade Unions.
Megginson, Nash, Netter and Poulsen (1998) explicitly study the choice between asset sales and share issue
privatisation. Empirically they find that state owned enterprises are more likely to be sold through a share
offering the larger is the firm, when the company being sold is a telecom, and the more developed is the
national stock market.
6 For an excellent survey of empirical studies on privatisation, the reader is referred to Megginson and
Netter (1999).
7 Vining and Boardman 1992 show this in market economies, while Claessens, Djankov and Pohl 1997
illustrate this for transition economies.
8 Many studies find no average effect of privatisation in transition countries. See for example Pinto et al,
1993.
9 The first year of available trade data for Slovakia and Slovenia was 1993 and 1992 respectively. In order
to derive the historical trade orientation of products for these countries therefore, it was necessary to trek
the characteristics of those products exported in the first available year of data back to the corresponding
trade data in 1988 for Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.
10 The sole exception to this is the Transport Equipment sector in Bulgaria, where 1988 EU trade oriented
products only account for 20 per cent of total exports to the EU in 1996. This would suggest that there has
been a reorientation of products from the CMEA to the EU market over time in this particular case.
11 For detailed information about the survey content, questionnaire and methodology see Bilsen (1997).
12 De Novo firms are typically much smaller than traditional firms, private upon entry. We wish to focus on
the impact of privatisation on tradition firms conditioned on their initial trade orientation. We therefore
exclude them from our analysis.  Konings (1997) using the same data undertakes a comparison of
traditional and de nova firm performance during transition.
13 See Estrin (1994) for details on the privatisation methods in Central Eastern Europe.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 338
37
14  See for example, Frydman, Pistor and Rapaczynski (1996), Blanchard and Aghion (1996), Pistor and
Spicer 1997, and Meyendorff and Snyder (1997).
15 Transition specific difficulties in such empirical measures of performance include the presence of high
and volatile inflation rates, variations in accounting standards to conform with western norms, appropriate
evaluation of inherited capital stock, and tax evasion. See Bevan, Estrin, and Schaffer (1999) for a more
detailed overview of these issues.
16 Note that only the ownership structure of a subsample of our 220 firms can be predicted due to certain
firms failing to fill in employment levels for 1992.THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
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